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FOREWORD
In December 2012, General Carter Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), told
students at Brown University that recent successes in
reducing the influence of al-Shabaab and presidential
elections in Somalia:
happened because the nations of East Africa collectively, and under the auspices of the African Union,
decided that they would take action. . . . It was the
regional states making that decision, crafting a plan
and then coming, frankly, to the international community and ask[ing] for some support, which the United
States and many others were able to provide. But it
was an African-led and-designed effort.

U.S. policy has long voiced support for the concept of “African solutions for African problems” but
has implemented plans that proved policymakers believed they knew better how to “fix” Africa. Now the
United States is beginning to support African solutions
by increasing partnerships with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) for coordinated security,
stability, and development efforts across sub-regions.
In this monograph, Diane Chido explores the evolution of the Organization for African Unity (OAU)
into the present-day African Union (AU) and considers optimal directions for this organization to achieve
both African and U.S. objectives for the continent in
the context of past, current, and future AFRICOM
engagement. Ms. Chido accedes that AFRICOM has
begun to engage with the RECs for more effective
and cost-efficient regional security and stability efforts, but recommends that this joint command place
greater coordinated emphasis on this approach as a
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series of smaller-scale “pilots” in order to form a longterm pan-continental strategy for U.S. engagement
in Africa.
Positive engagement in this often misunderstood
region requires a clear understanding of local decisionmaking environments and the stresses and influences under which such leaders or leaders-to-be may
be operating. The U.S. Army War College can provide
strategic research opportunities to identify up-andcoming individuals and groups in countries and counterpart organizations, such as RECs, especially suited
as partners for enhancing security and stability in
the region.
In this continuing age of austerity, discussions in
the defense arena focus on cost-effective solutions to
large problems. Regional and ultimately, continental,
approaches to Africa’s myriad security challenges that
directly affect U.S. national interests will increasingly
have a greater impact than single-country, piecemeal
military-to-military efforts. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute offers this monograph as a contribution to the debate on the future of U.S. Army engagement in Africa and how it can best enhance U.S.
competitiveness abroad and security at home.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Conflicts and extremism are almost certain to continue to rise in Africa, especially with instability resulting from the cascade of unrest across North Africa
and the Middle East, the burgeoning youth bulge in
Sub-Saharan Africa, African mercenaries, rising Islamic extremism, myriad wild, ungoverned spaces,
and increasing resource shortages resulting from
human activities and climate change across the Continent. In order to protect our troops while ensuring
stability in the region, we must develop the capacity
of a Pan-African force to deal effectively with these
and other likely problems as they arise.
Prevention is the key to effective policies in Africa,
whether the issue is equitable resource exploitation,
ethnic conflict, infectious diseases, or famine. Beginning now to develop well-trained, disciplined, and
well-equipped military and police forces that can
ensure stability in place of our own troops in future
conflicts and emergencies is a long-range stabilizing
method certain to pay for itself in the long-term. This
monograph provides a path toward developing a viable African Union capable of serving as a supranational governing body to drive stability, security, and
economic development by strengthening the capability of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as the
first step in a longer-term integration process.
Carefully implementing such a pan-continental
strategy is highly likely to have the net effect over the
next 20 years of attaining a considerable competitive
advantage for the U.S. economically, militarily, and
politically, with a corresponding increase in stability,
security, and economic opportunity in that region.
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FROM CHAOS TO COHESION:
A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY,
STABILITY, AND DEVELOPMENT
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
It takes many raindrops to form the pool from which
we all drink.
				Nigerian Proverb

Conflicts and extremism are nearly certain to continue to rise in Africa especially with instability resulting from the cascade of unrest across North Africa and
the Middle East, the burgeoning youth bulge in SubSaharan Africa, African mercenaries, rising Islamic
extremism, myriad wild, ungoverned spaces, and
increasing resource shortages resulting from human
activities and climate change across the Continent. In
order to protect our troops while ensuring stability
in the region, we must develop the capacity of a PanAfrican force to deal effectively with these and other
likely problems as they arise.
This monograph recommends a more comprehensive and strategic approach to developing PanAfrican plans for security, governance, and resource
exploitation, to reduce the need for U.S. and international physical intervention or post-conflict clean-up.
Beyond current engagement efforts by U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM) a long-term prevention and
management strategy is likely to reduce the need for
expensive piecemeal efforts with uncertain outcomes
and enhance the overall security and capacity of the
region to develop its own security, stability, gover-
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nance, and development plans that still ensure a competitive advantage for U.S. interests.
In March 2011, a glaring case developed which illustrated the need for such a comprehensive Pan-African strategy. An increasingly unstable Libya caused
Western leaders to discuss action, but who should lead
eclipsed public talk of what measures to take. A robust, U.S.-friendly African Union (AU) would likely
have been the most advantageous organization to lead
the Libyan intervention. However, many African government leaders, tribal chiefs and kings, and average
people had a positive view of Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, due to his infrastructure investments in
their countries. In fact, the AU itself exists largely due
to Gaddafi’s contributions, which included paying the
dues of a number of other member countries. This resulted in a hamstrung AU, which was unable to act
on behalf of its stated constituents, the African people,
for fear of taking the wrong side against an autocrat
who had plundered his country’s wealth for over 40
years and served as a clear model of the worst kind of
African leader. Therefore, without an effective African consultative body or force, the United States and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led
the airstrikes on Libya with the consequences, good or
bad, laid squarely on their shoulders.
The post-Gaddafi era provides an opportunity for
the United States to carefully guide the process of filling the power vacuum with a sensible pan-continental
approach to Africa’s problems of resource exploitation, governance, and delivering real political power
to the African people. However, before any of this
can take place, the key issues of security and stability
must be addressed. The April 2011 National Strategic
Narrative states that the primary U.S. goal in the 21st
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century is to “become the strongest competitor and
most influential player in a deeply interconnected
global system, which requires that we invest less in
defense and more in sustainable prosperity and the
tools of effective global engagement.”1 Through the
unique structure of AFRICOM, the U.S. Departments
of Defense (DoD) and State (DoS) can lead a cooperative initiative to pursue such an engagement strategy.
DISMAL INHERITANCE
Nigerian nationalism was, for me and many of my
generation, an acquired taste; like cheese or ballroom
dancing. . . .
		
		

Famed Nigerian novelist,
Chinua Achebe, 1998

Africa blames colonialism for its ills. Most countries only achieved independence in the 1960s, which
often led to civil wars and further dissolution of states
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Even in Kenya, once
a model of multiculturalism, the violence that occurred after the 2008 election sharply illustrates that
tribal and ethnic cultures—stretching back millennia—are driving the demand for scarce resources and
demonstrates that these cultural differences are still
more deeply valued than the national borders, which
have only been in place for a few short decades. The
arbitrary dividing of African geography has separated
historical lands, tribes, and even families into forced
concepts of “nations” that have not entirely taken
hold in the post-colonial period.
Although the AU has been in existence in name
for over 10 years, it remains a quasi-body, adept at
pronouncing initiatives to which it agrees but never
3

ratifies or moves to implement. Even when it decides
to act, it is often ineffectual. In March 2012, the AU
announced a 5,000-strong force that would hunt down
renegade warlord Joseph Kony and his 300 followers,
who were menacing the borderlands of Chad, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Uganda. As of August 2012, this force had
not even been assembled, with 100 U.S. Special Forces
Soldiers working with mainly Ugandan troops on this
effort. In the case of Libya, an AU delegation attempted to broker a settlement . . . the day after the NATO
bombing campaign began.
Ten years later, the question of whether the AU is
to be a union of equal sovereign states or a union of
“the African people,” is still unanswered. Today the
AU’s Pan-African Parliament (PAP), its primary governing authority, is still evolving in its role and composition. The PAP was established in 2002, with only
“advisory and consultative powers,” but is intended
to evolve into a “fully functioning legislative body
elected via full universal adult suffrage.”2 Will it be
a system in which each state gets the same number
of delegates or in which seats are assigned to various
ethnic groups on the basis of population? The PAP
structure and election process are critical decisions still
under advisement, which must be resolved before any
Pan-African governing can occur. Once the structure
is finally determined, the next issues concern how the
representatives will be selected within these sovereign
states: through direct elections, appointment by heads
of state or from among sitting parliamentarians?
The fact is, the optimal AU structure, including the
PAP makeup and deputy selection process, is inconsequential as long as it is transparent and agreed upon
within the states. As past efforts suggest, the current
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AU is highly unlikely to become a functioning body
able to implement Africa-wide decisions or policies
with any transformative effect in the near term. The
best approach is to start with regional blocs as models for AU development—the AU can dither for the
next 10 years while the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) lead the way to integration and experimentation with models that can
be applied continent-wide.
The late Nigerian economist Claude Ake’s 1997
statement, “Because of the historical legacy and objective conditions of contemporary Africa, a national
development project in most African countries is not
a rational undertaking,”3 lends credence to the need
for integrated markets and transnational policies
and projects. Although their names imply a focus on
economic development, the first priority for these regional economic communities (RECs) is to develop a
sound regional security structure.
U.S. Department of Defense/Department of State
(DoD/DoS) joint efforts should be focused on building the RECs’ capacity to ensure security and stability as the precondition for sustainable economic development. This regional approach gives the U.S. a
broader and more comprehensive target for furthering AFRICOM’s stated aims than current piecemeal
efforts in individual countries. While AFRICOM has
a relationship with ECOWAS and SADC, as well as
the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), and has begun some initiatives, such as the
2009 ECOWAS conference on security sector reform,
AFRICOM should focus more directly on this regional
approach to enable it to streamline its efforts and resources to build capacity in these larger blocs.
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While it is true that the same elites will likely attempt to co-opt any new system and that any new approach is likely to engender new problems, a larger,
continental context can make it more difficult for regional or national elites to gain as much power as they
have in their current fiefdoms. This approach will
support the eventual development of an AU structure
enabling the United States to support, engage with,
and realize competitive advantage across the entire
continent into the 22nd century.
REGIONAL COMMUNITIES’ FIRST STEP
TOWARD A VIABLE AFRICAN UNION
African Sovereign State Instability.
When we look at the surplus of unstable and corrupt states in Sub-Saharan Africa, we often shake our
heads and wonder, “Why can’t they all just get along?”
The long-standing competitive and complementary
relationships that developed over millennia across
Sub-Saharan Africa to survive climate changes and
other adversity have evolved into myriad specializations and identities that we call ethnic divides today.
Throughout the colonial period, Europeans saw Africans as a single, monolithic, sub-human group ripe
for exploitation and controllable across wide swathes
of territory, with no concern for existing ties. Richard
Dowden reminds us that even through the 1960s, as
the independence movement swept southern Africa:
In rural areas the kings and chiefs might still hold
sway but in the swelling towns young nationalist leaders were creating political awareness and building a
power base. They knew they had to break old loyalties
to chiefs and kings and replace it with loyalty to themselves and their parties.4
6

In 2008, the African Program and Leadership
Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center found the
“uncertain sense of national identity and community
in multiethnic states that can divide societies” when
constituent ethnic groups “do not see each other as
interdependent parts of a single national entity, [but]
often perceive members of other communities as ‘outsiders’, or, in the extreme, as dehumanized and threatening hostile adversaries.”5
These developing nations have managed to “leapfrog” technological stages, avoiding massive landline
infrastructure and more effectively implementing
cellular or other wireless communication strategies.
Why then can they not “leap over” the statist phase
of political development? As Francis Fukuyama has
suggested, our traditional view of sovereign states
operating under their own individual self-interest is
evolving, noting that since the early 1980s:
the trend in world politics has been to weaken states
. . . the growth of the global economy has tended to
erode the autonomy of sovereign nation-states by increasing the mobility of information, capital, and, to a
lesser extent, labor. . . .6

Like the looting of valuable but obsolete copper
wiring, Sub-Saharan Africa can take some examples
of effective state-building to create a Pan-African decisionmaking structure without the messy nationalistic
wrangling that led to the destructive outcomes of two
world wars in Europe. Africa could also avoid some of
the violent destruction that the United States underwent during its civil war, and achieve a resulting political federation of independently operating but mutually dependent states with diverse cultures intact.
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Harvard’s Steven Pinker provides some evidence
that such integration reduces competition and violence, whether the associations are Neighborhood
Watch groups or international governmental organizations (IGOs) as the third side of what he describes as
a Kantian “triangle of pacifying forces” in which democratization, trade, and membership in cooperative
organizations significantly reduce the likelihood that
countries will go to war with each other. Pinker notes:
Nations become stable democracies only when their
political factions tire of murder as the means of assigning power. They engage in commerce only when
they put a greater value on mutual prosperity than on
unilateral glory. And they join intergovernmental organizations only when they are willing to cede a bit of
sovereignty for a bit of mutual benefit.7

African countries, by and large, have been only
too willing to cede, if not sovereignty, responsibility
for good governance in exchange for the largesse of
many of the organizations they have joined in the last
60 years. From the International Monetary Fund (the
Fund), the World Bank (the Bank), and the United
Nations (UN), many of these countries treated such
memberships as proof that they were fully functioning independent states or as signs that they were
equals on the world stage. However, many of these organizations had simply become another avenue of dependence and their mandated expenditures or policy
requirements in exchange for funds did not engender
the good governance and opportunities for economic
development promised. This can be attributed both
to the IGOs’ lack of enforcement and to the national
governments’ lack of will to follow prescribed implementation plans and the funds essentially evaporated
without the anticipated returns appearing.
8

However, real participation in an IGO that has direct relevance to Sub-Saharan African countries’ interests and needs will depend as much on each member
taking part in developing the policies for the region as
a whole, rather than having them imposed from without. This would be a new kind of cooperative model
into which the AU could eventually evolve with the
RECs beginning to provide a sort of pilot integration.
EU/NATO Model for Integration?
As the European Union (EU), or at the very least
the Eurozone, deals with the messy political, economic, and social ramifications of the current financial crisis, “continental” consolidation does not seem to be
a positive development model for the 21st century.
However, we must look to Europe not as a model
made of plaster, but as one made of soft clay, still malleable and which cannot be identically grafted onto
Africa. We must look for positive lessons for continental integration and clearly understand the very different motivations and processes that created the current
EU/NATO structure.
First of all, the victorious Allies established NATO
after World War II as a defensive alliance against the
perceived international agenda of Communist expansion emanating from the Soviet Union. It was also
seen as a way to join together the European countries
that had engaged in brutal conflict twice in one halfcentury with such devastating consequences. Seeing
the Soviet Union as a shared threat provided simple
demarcation of who was “in” and who was “out.”
Similarly, since the 16th century, the greatest
threats to Africa had also come from external influences in the form of colonial and post-colonial re-
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source exploitation through the Cold War proxy conflicts that resulted in destructive civil wars. Africa’s
greatest threats today, however, tend to come from
within. The continent’s lack of economic development
relative to the rest of the world has led to a lack of
education, healthcare, infrastructure, and good governance that hamper future development. Therefore, a
cooperative transcontinental structure should provide
stability and cohesion to overcome the lack of governance most of its individual states have shown to date,
and provide a continent-wide basis for development
of institutions to more transparently, effectively, and
equitably resolve critical problems, such as land use
and distribution, resource exploitation, and trade.
While some suggest applying a type of Marshall
Plan to Africa, the differences between the two cases
are stark. In her 2009 book, Dead Aid, Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo points out that Marshall Plan
funds were intended to be provided to Europe after
World War II for a specific period of time (5 years)
without renewal, at which time, recipients were to begin paying them back, as they were loans, not grants.
Most importantly, they were targeted at rebuilding
infrastructure, not for any other purpose. The fact that
the structures and the institutions to effectively manage the funds and the projects were already in place
in the European beneficiaries, differentiates any potential use of this framework as a model for Africa.
However, simply waiting until the institutional governance structure in African countries match those
which developed in Western Europe over centuries is
also not a tenable prospect.
Using the Marshall Plan as a model of cross-continental infrastructure building as opposed to past
piecemeal efforts in preferred countries does have po-
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tential viability. However, the funds should not be in
the form of undetermined payback loans nor certainly
given freely as grants, but should flow as foreign direct
investment (FDI). This way, as investors are taking the
risk, the RECs, not individual governments, would be
the recipients. These entities are better suited to manage interstate activities, such as building robust transportation and power generation structures that can
serve more than a single country or constituency with
realistic risk calculations and clear incentives for private investment, than any single constituent country.
United States of Africa? Was Gaddafi Right?
Africa, as a continent, resembles America in the
fact that it is made up of 54 states, much like the
United States. When it comes to dealing with culture,
education, healthcare, law enforcement, and even
violence, American states’ approaches and outcomes
vary widely. However, we do not despair that there is
no hope for the states in which education achievement
lags or violence is highest, we simply continue to try
strategies that have worked to bring other states along
the development continuum.
The optimal economic, political, and social development model for Africa, rather than the EU, therefore, could be the United States. Individual U.S. states
are responsible for education, healthcare, and providing social services and police to varying degrees as
mandated by each state’s electorate. American states,
for instance, are free to engage in their own international trading regimes and support the trading businesses in their jurisdictions, but they can also rely on
the Federal Government to provide assistance and
create the environment in which smaller entities can
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more effectively operate. The Federal Government
is primarily responsible for continental defense and
emergency and natural disaster prevention, planning,
and response, as well as consistency in administration
of public land and its use, international trade, and
energy policy.
Security First.
The initial phase of an integration process in Africa, however, just as NATO presaged the EU, should be
focused on developing the security structure and apparati that can be rapidly deployed to prepare for and
respond to natural and man-made disasters, prevent
conflict and violence, and provide stability in fragile
post-conflict states. The RECs of Africa can look to the
EU for a general security-development model, which
grew out of post-war European efforts to limit Germany’s ability to make weapons of war and to consolidate trade in the commodities of growth in the period.
It essentially began in 1951 with the six nations of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) before
spreading across the continent by the end of the century. While common security and economic consolidation were the primary aims of Western European
integration, the current crisis illustrates that perhaps
common political structures ought to be in place before integrating currency regimes, for instance. In the
case of Africa, a shared currency is a very long way off
with the disparity in purchasing power of its states.
However, shared policymaking on the big issues and
shared security structures can be the early steps to
continental integration.
Initial steps toward a Pan-African approach to
continental security are already being taken. As the
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RECs have consolidated their efforts in this area, they
also increasingly work consultatively to address other
continent-wide issues. Existing and emerging cooperative structures within the RECs, and even the AU,
can provide a viable platform upon which to provide
assistance with needed reforms within and eventually across regions with positive effects on individual
countries. In this way, leaders from various factions
within member states can support security and stability efforts without the stigma of propping up the
national leadership in highly corrupt or failing states.
Leaders of ethnic groups straddling borders can also
give their entire population a voice without alienating
or alarming national governments in a single state.
The AU was created in 2002 as a successor to the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which had become all but irrelevant by the time of South African
liberation. From its inception, the new organization
was torn between its two largest contributors and
their two larger-than-life leaders: Libya’s Muammar
Gaddafi and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki:
Gaddafi’s dream was to see a continental government,
one African military force, uniform trade and foreign
policies and one leader representing all the African
states in dealing with the rest of the world. . . . On the
other hand, Mbeki’s mission was to create a continent
ruled by like-minded African democrats who shared
his goals of competitive markets, technological advancement, progressing economies, and industrious
populations.8

Neither achieved their goals and, with Gaddafi
out of the way, now is the time for the United States
to step in and subtly enable both visions by first developing an African military force that can provide
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security and stability and smoothing national trade
restrictions to develop a continental trade regime, and
second by identifying and encouraging democratic
leaders who will entice foreign investors by developing the governance structures to enable prosperity
and advancement across the region. Such a Pan-African goal is strategic, but in the nearer-term, such goals
are more attainable at the REC level. This gradual approach will allow a smoother transition to continental-wide policies because they will need only input
from two or three regional bodies, rather than from 54
individual states.
The political process has been stalled since 2002 by
wrangling over the form a functioning AU will take.
The question of whether the AU is to be a union of
equal sovereign states or a union of “the African people,” is still unanswered. Will it become a system in
which each state gets the same number of delegates or
in which seats are assigned to various ethnic groups
on the basis of population? The first system will give
utterly disparate states, such as South Africa and
Lesotho, the same weight in the legislature and likely
undermine the entire effort, due to a resulting lack of
participation by regional anchors, whose influence is
not fully represented. The second method will continue to marginalize minority ethnic or other groups. A
possible resolution is a bicameral legislature with upper and lower chambers to balance representational
issues. Another method would assign seats on the basis of regional blocs, which could increase regionalism
and ultimately lead to transcontinental cohesion.
Once the structure is finally determined, the next
issues concern how the deputies will be selected within these sovereign states: through direct elections or
appointment by heads of state or from among sitting
14

parliamentarians. Experts have noted that ensuring
the democratic credentials of the PAP are among the
key indicators of a functioning and internationally
recognized AU. African commentators anticipate a
“democratic dividend,” with regional integration ensuring more democratic processes than are currently
in place. This is more likely if the RECs are able to
serve as models and then as the entities that integrate
to form the full AU.
In 2004, Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies
Institute of the U.S. Army War College emphasized
significantly that because of “the great value that
African culture places on collective action, the most
tangible gains have come from building on existing
structures.”9 A great shortcoming of Western policy
in Africa, and elsewhere throughout modern history,
is an assumption that we are working with a blank
slate upon which we can impose our own plans and
methods, and a failure to recognize the importance
of existing cultural values. Regional approaches enable cultural values to coexist with national interest in
multiethnic areas where broader consensus and more
collegial decisionmaking are possible than in single
states where one ethnic group dominates or groups
are divided by national borders. As Richard Dowden
pointed out in 2004, “In the end, power in Africa derives not from outside support but from within, from
old networks and pre-colonial power systems that lie
beneath.” The regional approach also permits these
networks to maintain some influence, while avoiding
the monolithic decisionmaking processes that occur in
many single-party states.
The AU’s own 2009-12 Strategic Plan articulated
the publicly espoused shared interests within African states toward greater common governance.10 The
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stated mission of the AU's Commission is to become
an efficient and value-adding institution driving the
African integration and development process in collaboration with African Union member states, the
Regional Economic Communities [RECs] and African
citizens.”11
Today’s African Union Security Structure.
Many African states structured their military
forces as if the most significant threats were likely to
come from over the new border, although the truly
significant challenges to stability tend to be internal.
African governments also often identified threats as
requiring military intervention, even in cases of dealing with legitimate (from a Western viewpoint) political opposition, thus, “even ordinary governance
issues were militarized.”12 Any legitimate AU needs
a standing, unified, well trained and equipped, multinational force to prevent genocide, intervene in civil
wars and interstate conflicts, prepare for and respond
to natural and other disasters, as well as oversee and
provide security for large-scale, interstate infrastructure projects.
The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) is comprised of 15 member states which are responsible for
“deployment of peace keeping and quick intervention
Missions to assist in cases of genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity.”13 In order to enact such deployments, the PSC “could consult a Panel of the Wise
comprising [sic] of five African personalities so as to
take action on the distribution of the military on the
field.”14 Its functions are listed as (a) . . . the promotion
of peace, security and stability in Africa; (b) preventative diplomacy and the maintenance of peace; and
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(c) management of catastrophes and humanitarian actions.15 Therefore, it is entirely within the purview of
the PSC to ensure that an entity exists to be deployed
to assist in the cases described, and suggests that such
an entity should take the form of a military, or at least
a military-style organization.
The African Stand-by Force (ASF) was established
under Article 13 of the PSC protocol to enable PSC
engagement in “Peace support missions and intervention pursuant to the Constitutive Act Article 4(h),”
which permits action under “grave circumstances,
namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity”and 4(j), which grants member states the
right to “request intervention from the Union in order
to restore peace and security.”16
Regional Approach to African Security.
In 2004, the AU decided to create five regional brigades as “first responders to emergencies both manmade and natural” that occur on the continent. However, delays have kept the force in the planning stages
since its public announcement in 2005. The latest mandate for a “validated and exercised” 7,000-strong
brigade-sized force by January 2010 was not met. Initially, member states were to be responsible for training their personnel along regional stand-by standards
to ensure interoperability with each other and with
the UN. While the AU currently endorses and works
in concert with eight regional economic councils,
ECOWAS and SADC are currently the most effective,
ubiquitous, and focused on security.
Of the RECs initially mandated to develop a standby force, ECOWAS has made the most progress. In
June 2004, the ECOWAS Defence and Security Com-
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mittee approved the formation of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) envisioning a Task Force (TF) of 2,773
military, police, and civilian personnel able to deploy
within 30 days and fully self-sustaining for 90 days,
and an ESF Main Force (MF) of 3,893 military, police,
and civilian personnel able to deploy within 90 days
and be fully self-sustaining for 90 days.
The ESF held its first significant exercises in June
2009 to evaluate its logistical capability, with 10
ECOWAS member states to contribute 1,270 military
personnel for week-long field training in Burkina
Faso.17 In November 2011, the ESF held a training
exercise, dubbed Jigui III, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana.
The goal was to test the MF capabilities in strategic
and operational planning and preparation for multidimensional operations and to exercise command and
control training.
The SADC Brigade was launched at the 2007
SADC Summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, through a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by
southern African leaders to “guarantee peace, security and political stability, which are prerequisites for
development.” The Brigade is to be comprised of civilian, military, and police components and supported
through pledged resources from member states.
The Brigade was envisioned as one of five regional
brigades comprising the ASF with troops or personnel based in their own countries, deployed as needed
on an “on call” basis. The Regional Peace Training
Centre located in Zimbabwe and other national peace
support training institutions were to play pivotal roles
in training military commanders, police officers, and
civilian officials at various levels, while at the same
time acting as the “clearinghouse” for all peace support operations and training activities in the region.
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However, Zimbabwe has since become something of a
regional embarrassment, and many of its SADC rights
and responsibilities have been suspended.
The Brigade’s only permanent force structure has a
Planning Element at the SADC Secretariat in Botswana, consisting of regional military, police, and civilian
staff on rotation from member states. The Planning
Element operates daily as part of the SADC Organ
on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation commanded by the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence
Staff and the Committee of SADC Police Chiefs.
SADC member states have also agreed to establish the Main Logistics Depot in Botswana to support
the operations of the force from a central point. Discussions between the SADC Secretariat and the government of Botswana are said to be “at an advanced
stage” to enter into an MOU establishing the depot.
By 2009, the Brigade was renamed the SADC Stand-by
Force (SADC SF) to indicate that it had its civilian and
police, and not just military components, in place. The
SADC SF has also held a variety of training exercises
in various member countries to meet its obligations.18
AFRICOM in concert with the Canadian government, also developed the Partnership for Integrated
Logistics Operations and Tactics (PILOT) in 2009 for
enhancing the ASF capacity for operational logistics
planning to promote interoperability between the U.S.
military and the ASF.19 While there were 14 exercises
scheduled with the U.S. Army across Africa in 2012
alone, identifying additional opportunities to build
African capacity and enhance the ubiquity of U.S. tactics and methods through regional blocs, rather than
simply with individual states, should be a priority of
AFRICOM’s leadership and planning staff in order to
ensure the broadest possible U.S. engagement.
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APPLYING REGIONAL APPROACHES TO KEY
SECURITY THREATS
Sub-Saharan Africa is the least secure, stable, and
economically developed geographic region in the
world, with its long-standing problems exacerbated
by recent unrest in Northern Africa, the prevalence of
well-armed African mercenaries, ungoverned spaces
that are a natural draw for terrorist groups and insurgencies, frequent conflicts over resources, and the
region’s own demographic disadvantages. Both increasing Islamic extremism and disparities in income
and opportunity are also found in the governable and
least governed areas alike. However, today’s threats,
or perceived threats, may not be eternal but should be
considered within the historical and political context
of the region and as outliers in the world’s overall trajectory toward violence reduction.
While individual countries make varying degrees
of effort to reduce the impact of these threats within
their own borders, a regional approach is likely to be
more effective in most cases. When ethnic groups or
wild spaces cross borders, more than one government
is involved. With U.S. support, SADC and ECOWAS
are striving in various ways, but the emphasis on ensuring the security and stability of Sub-Saharan Africa
should be in supporting the development of increasingly robust mechanisms for these regional efforts with
an eye to full regional integration of all of southern
Africa within a viable AU future framework.
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North African Unrest and Islamic Extremism.
While this monograph is focused on Sub-Saharan
Africa, the effects of recent unrest in northern Africa
cannot be ignored. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia,
and most significantly Libya, have undergone dramatic change since the start of 2011. While these “revolutions” have brought varying degrees of change,
outcomes remain far from certain. Indeed, they all had
“organic” origins, but saw differing levels of international assistance (or meddling, depending upon your
perspective), with Libya the extreme case of Western
involvement.
A robust and independent AU would have been
the most appropriate organization to lead an intervention in Libya. However, the AU was one of the
last organizations willing to act in this case as it was
fully under the sway of the funding and influence of
Libya’s Gaddafi. It also focused on the consequences of
supporting the wrong side in the conflict, rather than
focusing on the best outcome from Africa’s perspective. Of course, many African government leaders,
tribal chiefs and kings, as well as average people, had
a positive view of Gaddafi due to his infrastructure
investments across Africa. In fact, the AU in its current form exists largely because of Gaddafi’s contributions, which amounted to nearly 15 percent of African
countries’ share of the total budget. Gaddafi even paid
the dues of several other member countries.20 Therefore, without an effective African consultative body or
force, the United States and NATO led the airstrikes
on Libya with ultimate consequences, good or bad,
laid squarely on their shoulders.
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To avoid the need for UN, U.S., or European
intervention in all future conflicts and insurgencies, AFRICOM should continue to engage with the
RECs to enhance security sector reform and civil
society development programs to enable REC leadership to more effectively manage conflicts in their
respective regions.
African Mercenaries and Insurgencies.
Gaddafi was also responsible for much of the
development of African mercenary groups later contracted as “third party nationals” to provide security
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Deploying and
paying members of potentially restive tribal groups
to work outside the country was an effective method
for keeping them from forming an opposition to his
autocratic rule. Now with the United States out of Iraq
and its role in Afghanistan winding down, those guns
for hire will be looking for new hotspots. Many will
return home to Africa with, as an Eritrean economist
recently commented, ”no skills other than raping and
killing.”21
Even as Libyan government forces continued to
fight, observers voiced concern over the need to secure the massive weapons caches known to be located
around the country. Despite early efforts, this arsenal
is making its way around already over-armed SubSaharan Africa, even as the coalition and Libya’s own
National Transitional Council (NTC) take steps to safeguard what was left. In addition to small arms, tens of
thousands of landmines and even more sophisticated
surface-to-air missiles (SAM) have disappeared from
poorly guarded storage facilities.22
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Numerous African governments are currently in
power as a direct result of coups and guerilla wars.
The “demobilization” phase of post-conflict stability
development causes many of these former fighters to
be offered minimal training or payments in transitioning to civilian life. When the Ugandan war ended in
1986, current President Yoweri Museveni boasted that
at one time he could call up one million trained fighters, but has an official army of only 65,000 today. If
true, where have all those combatants gone?
A February 2011 Foreign Policy article noted, “Recent conflicts in [West Africa] have generated a steady
supply of unemployed ex-fighters willing to move
from conflict to conflict for the right price.”23 One estimate places the number of Ugandans working for
private U.S. contractors as security guards in Iraq at
15,000,24 with returning U.S. service personnel suggesting the number was likely twice that. Even with
the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) reporting
a very low 2010 unemployment rate of 4.2 percent,25
the question for these mercenaries must be, “where
to next?”
As Ugandan journalist Charles Onyango-Obbo
commented in November 2011:
When Africans go into the hired gun business, it increases the potential for intra-continental conflicts as
is happening in Libya. But it is also as good an indicator of the effect of the hyper-militarization and militarization that happened in Africa in the 1990s. Because
African mercenaries probably charge less than former
British SASs or American Marines, the number of African mercenaries and guards will only grow, not decline, over the coming years.26
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The recent coup in Mali is the result of the return
from Libya of Tuareg mercenaries, with equipment
and experience enabling them to outperform the poorly equipped Malian military units that were deployed
to suppress the Tuareg uprisings. In late 2011, hundreds of such militants returned from Libya armed and
ready to form the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA), which took control of several northern
towns in 2 months. In March 2012, frustrated Malian
Army soldiers under Captain Amadou Sanogo staged
a coup, which led to looting and violent street protests
in one of Africa’s poorer countries.27 Worse still is the
imposition of sharia law in this region of Mali and the
continuing destruction of ancient artifacts considered
“un-Islamic.”
Hand-in-hand with the experience armed men for
hire gain in international security contracting is their
access to small arms and other weapons. Arms proliferation has been a problem contributing to insecurity
and instability in the region since the 1870s. As John
Reader reported in his 2007 “biography” of Africa,
guns were a “popular purchase” of those working in
the Kimberly (now South Africa) diamond mines: “It
has been argued that some African leaders sent cohorts of young men to the mines expressly to acquire
weapons for use in territorial disputes.”28 Due to the
easy availability of automatic weapons, loosely guarded armories worldwide, and “aid” rendered to client
states by both sides in the Cold War, mercenaries have
the capacity to add to this problem by returning home
with their own private arsenals, better trained and
equipped than their own national government troops,
as the situation in Mali attests.
In response to the coup in Mali, ECOWAS placed
severe economic sanctions on the country, which re-
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sulted in the junta leader agreeing in early April to
step down in exchange for amnesty for all coup participants (and a pension and mansion for himself), and
for permitting the Parliamentary Speaker Dioncounda Traore to serve as Interim President for 2 months
while elections were prepared. However, on May 20,
ECOWAS approved Traore’s request to remain in
power until April 2013, which resulted in mass protests during which members of a mob entered President Traore’s office and physically attacked him.
Many coup supporters view the extension of Traore’s
term as “unilateral” interference in Mali’s affairs by
ECOWAS and as propping up the old regime. Although ECOWAS has agreed to monitor the election preparation process to ensure transparency and
to provide an opportunity for Tuareg grievances to
be aired, protestors are in favor of holding elections
sooner than had been originally planned.29
On the other hand, Niger, which has also had a
history of Tuareg rebellion, dealt with their heavily
armed returnees from Libya through a proven postconflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) strategy. The Niger government disarmed
Tuareg groups as they entered the country and integrated their leaders into the government, including
the new Tuareg prime minister appointed in April
2011 and the majority of local officials in Agadez, the
Tuareg-majority region. The United States is assisting
these efforts by conducting aerial surveillance of the
region through its Pan-Sahelian Counter Terrorism
Initiative.30
Ensuring that demobilized militants are able to
quickly reintegrate into society and contribute economically so that they are able to support themselves,
their families, and maintain or increase status in their
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communities are critical elements of post-conflict security and stability. However, the Niger government
rightly fears that if not managed quickly, the unrest in
Mali could undermine its own fragile peace.
While the Tuareg situation has encouraging aspects, it is a typically complex situation. It presents
an opportunity for an African REC to immediately
respond to a crisis and work productively with all
sides to resolve it without relying exclusively on external powers, such as the UN, to take the initiative, or
on individual countries to deal with a problem with
cross-border implications. This is an excellent test case
for ECOWAS’ ability to serve in a regional security capacity, building upon its recent success in ending the
October 2010 post-election violence in Cote d’Ivoire.
However, at this stage, a single member with U.S.
assistance is faring better at dealing with the Tuareg
situation than is the REC. Future efforts should focus
on developing more effective REC mechanisms for
managing conflict within its sphere of regional influence. As the RECs become more effective and influential, they will form the base for full integration in the
entire Sub-Saharan region.
Dangerous Spaces.
When we talk about dangerous spaces, our minds
first turn to Somalia or other such weak or failing
states. Such appellations might apply to parts of
Mexico and to large pockets of the Middle East since
early 2011. Much of the American “Wild” West and
Southwest were also essentially “ungoverned” until
the beginning of the 20th century, but those regions
have since been “tamed.”
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These spaces can even exist in the most stable and
secure states where, as Dr. Phil Williams puts it, there
are “governance gaps,” such as the roughest, lawless
parts of America’s big cities. In these urban zones or in
very remote rural areas, neither side calls 911 or hails
the friendly policeman on the corner.
These areas are mainly populated by people Dr.
Steven Pinker calls “stateless,” those for whom the
larger justice system is not intended or inclined to
support. This can be due to ethnic, economic, or other
demographic circumstances, which the larger society
tends to ascribe to such individuals. Such “stateless”
individuals, regardless of where they are located, cannot rely on the state at any level for protection and
assurances of security. Therefore, they must rely on
what elites derisively call the “code of the street” or
“self-help justice,” while the same educated Westerners look approvingly upon the phenomenon, depending upon who is exhibiting it and where, calling it a
“code of honor” or a “tribal” or “cultural norm,” and
insisting that it be maintained and respected. Therefore, zones of state failure can exist inside states seen
to have achieved “success” in terms of security, stability, and prosperity.
Although they once were prevalent in many places in the United States, today these governance gaps
represent small pockets of the American landscape.
They have largely been brought under control in the
past 100 years, and again since the 1980s, when the
crack cocaine craze seemed poised to tear American
cities apart. Today, we are now shocked by stories of
clan violence and feuds in Africa, although they are
not dissimilar from the lawlessness and violence that
often wracked the U.S. frontier as the line of settlement continued moving farther west from the original
colonies through the 1880s.
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Just because Africa marks time on the same calendar we do, does not mean all the 21st century developments have occurred to bring it to the place where
we are now. While the United States is now far less
violent than it was a century ago, it is still three times
more violent than its northern neighbor or than Western Europe. Pinker argues this is due to the shorter
time the United States has had since consolidation to
benefit from civilizing influences. America has had
over 200 years to become only three times as violent
as Europe, where violence began to diminish only in
the mid-1600s as city-states consolidated and Hobbes’
leviathan began to develop, while African states have
only had, in most cases, 30-50 years, and we wonder
why they have not yet caught up.
Post-colonial Africa unfortunately developed in
much the same way, at least at the outset, as did postcolonial America, as Pinker points out:
In Europe, first the state disarmed the people and
claimed a monopoly on violence, then the people
took over the apparatus of the state. In America, the
people took over the state before it had forced them to
lay down their arms—which, as the Second Amendment famously affirms, they reserve the right to keep
and bear. In other words, Americans in the South and
West, never fully signed on to a social contract that
would vest the government with a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force. In much of American history,
legitimate force was also wielded by posses, vigilantes, lynch mobs, company police, detective agencies,
and Pinkertons, and even more often kept as a prerogative of the individual.31

Since the 1960s, Africa has been rent by interstate
and intrastate conflict with the Sub-Saharan region
still home to many of the “dangerous spaces,” where
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Dr. Williams notes “the danger flows out from its
origin or locus in zones characterized by turbulence,
through various forms of connectivity, to zones of
order and stability.”32
The key for the RECs, therefore, is to identify and
prioritize the most lawless or “ungoverned” spaces
within their respective region, and with U.S. assistance to develop action plans to “tame” these areas
in order to reduce their attractiveness to destabilizing forces, such as insurgent, extremist, or criminal
groups that naturally gravitate toward them for bases
of operation, as is being done in the Sahel. This will
give the RECs additional influence and capability over
individual governments that are not effectively dealing with the problems in their own territory and further support the regional integration process.
Demographics.
The issue of developing countries’ burgeoning
youth bulge is a subject dealt with in depth in many
other fine research efforts and does not need to be
dived into headlong here. However, it is certainly a potentially destabilizing factor in regions without clear
gains in economic development. What are the options
for the exploding population of young men now aged
15 to 30 in Sub-Saharan Africa? Like gangs in the lawless sprawling U.S. housing projects, the mercenary or
criminal life is likely to present an attractive alternative to many of those without other options.
The RECs can play a role in mitigating this problem by coordinating with each other and with the
countries willing to provide training and education
to develop the human capital needed to participate
in existing labor markets. Such efforts are likely to
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present opportunities for young men to participate in
increasingly viable labor markets and enable them to
support their families, becoming integrated into society, rather than encouraging them toward “outlaw”
status. Viewing these young men as potential destabilizers and as a problem to prevent instead of eradicate
after the fact should provide the impetus to develop a
sort of pre-DDR approach to literacy and vocational
skills development across the region, once needed
skills have been identified.
One of the major issues preventing the growth of
labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, beyond the failure of governments to require indigenous labor quotas to be met by those intending to invest or operate
in the region, is the high level of labor protection that
makes using such indigenous resources highly restrictive. As Scott Taylor reported in 2009:
Across five measures used [by the World Bank] to
calculate the ease (or difficulty) of employing workers—indices for difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours,
difficulty of firing, rigidity of employment, and firing
costs (weeks of salary)—sub-Saharan Africa ranks
substantially lower than every other region of the
globe. These ancillary costs related to hiring and firing workers render the business climate unattractive,
particularly to potential new investors, who simply
choose to take their capital elsewhere.33

The RECs can work together to assess and mitigate
this problem on a regional level in order to augment
the value of their collective markets.
The RECs’ enhanced ability to attract FDI can also
provide the opportunity to set labor requirements for
investors requiring a given percentage of regionallyindigenous labor in order to receive permits or tax
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abatements. Such requirements can only be made
without undermining FDI flows once the requisite
skills are made available in the region. One of the major complaints of Africans against Chinese investment
is the lack of opportunities created for the indigenous
labor force. The Chinese argument is that this labor
force lacks the skills and the work ethic to push investment projects forward.
One example of unrest that has continued for decades is in the Niger Delta, due to the Nigerian government’s disastrous environmental policies in the
region and its extraction of oil without return remittances or services, as well as a failure to provide employment opportunities for Niger Delta residents in
the oil industry. This situation can be reversed across
REC areas with a concentrated effort to develop human capacity, which will enhance the attractiveness
of investment, reduce the instability caused by unemployment, and raise the level of economic development within the regions in the long term.
Resource Shortages Resulting in Conflict.
Western studies have increasingly shown the likelihood that change will cause or exacerbate shortages
of water and other resources over the next 100-plus
years. Even U.S. military assessments have expressed
concern for, and discussed prevention of, an anticipated increased violence in already resource-poor
areas. However, violence over resources may not be
inevitable.
In 2008, political scientist Ole Theisen produced a
regression analysis on armed conflicts between 1980
and 1992 that indicated an unsurprising correlation
among poverty, high population, political instability,
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and the abundance of oil—conflict was more likely
in the presence of these factors. More surprisingly,
drought, water shortages and some land degradation
had little effect in increasing the likelihood of an outbreak or continuation of violence.
However, Theisen suggests that poverty and agricultural dependence are likely to have a greater effect
on lower-level conflicts. He further suggests a need
for “closer scrutiny of whether it is the scarcity of renewable resources per se or their social distribution
that is the most important factor in linking conflict to
scarce resources.”34 John Reader spends hundreds of
pages describing the historically symbiotic relationships that existed across Africa among very different
peoples with varying divisions of labor who cooperated in times of environmental pressure to cope with
changing conditions without resorting to intergroup
violence.35
It is more likely that the introduction of cash crops
and valuable resources for export result in wide-scale
oppression and conflict. As one Kenyan observer
noted, “All the Kenyans I know pray every night that
oil will not be discovered in our country, or it will
tear itself apart in no time.”36 Unfortunately for these
Kenyans, trouble began in early 2012 with the announcement that oil had indeed been found in their
country. With the 2008 example of violent conflict over
which group had the right to plunder the country still
a fresh memory, this is a case in which a functioning
AU and its supporters should prepare for the worst
before the first drop of oil comes out of the ground.
Rather than continuing the current practice of a
few national elites exploiting natural resources to fill
their own coffers, RECs can help to develop regional
approaches to resource exploitation. Botswana has
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shown that its diamond revenues can be reinvested
into health and education for its population so as to
increase the standard of living and, thus stability and
security, for continued economic development. In
2008, the country had the highest level of Gross Capital Formation as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (32.4 percent) in the SADC region, even
ahead of South Africa (22.8 percent), which is actually
Botswana’s biggest foreign investor.37
While the countries with the most lucrative extractive industries, such as Angola and Nigeria with
their known oil reserves and questionable stability,
will continue to attract the most FDI, instability notwithstanding, in the long term, more sustainable approaches to FDI attraction will need to be formulated
as these resources disappear. Botswana’s diamonds
may be mined out one day, but its educated population will maintain its skills and competitiveness in the
region and beyond. Applying this approach to human capital formation on a regional scale will further
enhance investment potential to the larger regional
market and thus opportunities for economic development, reducing dependency on limited resources.
DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT THROUGH
REGIONAL MARKETS
Much of the approach to development in Africa
has been backward, with international organizations
from the UN to United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to the World Bank trying
for decades to create transparent governing institutions that reduce corruption and encourage foreign
investment. However, they tend to work with the
same elites that are gorging themselves at the public
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trough. The organic path that Western Europe itself
followed over centuries to nourish an environment in
which economic development begins and then, once
people have something to protect, such as productive
private land or a small manufacturing facility, they
themselves spearhead development of the institutions
needed to protect those assets, is lacking in the African post-colonial experience. Creating the opportunities to develop such assets should be the first step, not
the last. This means a secure and stable environment
in which investors will see a greater return than risk.
Africa has thus far failed to develop a robust industrial base to enable it to evolve beyond a commodity
provider, which keeps export prices low and devalues
individual African currencies. This in turn, reduces
interest in investing in African industry beyond commodity extraction, and maintains a lower standard
of living for the majority of Africans. As Ake noted
in 1997, “Africa needs to be productive and competitive and to diversify and strive for industrialization
instead of being fixated on commodity prices. . . .”38
Even with this dependence upon subsistence industries such as agriculture and extraction, the Chicago
Council on Foreign Affairs estimates that only 4 percent of sub-Saharan farmland is irrigated, and onethird to one-half of its harvest routinely goes to waste
due to poor storage facilities, outmoded markets, and
a lack of transportation infrastructure.39
Ralph Olaye, Manager of the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Division at the
African Development Bank (AfDB), noted in January
2012 that Africa needs $360 billion in infrastructure
investment to achieve full connectivity with the rest
of the world by 2040.40 A December 2011 World Bank
report noted that the SADC region needs $2.1 billion
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annually for a decade to complete and maintain its
required infrastructure and that for southern Africa,
“[r]egional integration is the only likely way to overcome existing handicaps and to allow the SADC member states to participate in the global economy.”41
With over one billion potential consumers, who
currently have very little collective purchasing power,
Africa remains a poor investment risk. However, African industries in which African entrepreneurs can sell
to African consumers can be based on African purchasing preferences and indigenous inputs. This can
increase the standard of living and enhance the power
of individual Africans as consumers, provide more
jobs of varying skill level and type, and broaden the
economic power in order to wrest it from a handful
of national elites who ensure that African economies
continue to fail to trade with one another.
British economist Barrington Moore stated in
1967, “[C]ertain historical processes need to develop,
notably the emergence of a large middle-class, in order to sustain a viable democratic state.”42 The keys
to creating opportunities for producing that middle
class include security, stability, and infrastructure,
not more aid. As former World Bank economist Moyo
emphasizes:
Not only is aid easy to steal, as it is usually provided
directly to African governments, but it also makes control over government worth fighting for . . . Foreign direct investment and rapidly growing exports, not aid,
have been the key to China’s economic miracle. Africa
needs to learn from Asia.43

Moyo further notes:
Africa’s common challenges are real and undeniably
stark, fortunes and misfortunes are intertwined. Even
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where there are pockets of economic success, it is
worth remembering that in the long term no country
in Africa can truly exist as an island of prosperity on
its own.44

Erastus Mwencha, Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa's (COMESA) outgoing SecretaryGeneral, declared in 2008 that:
Efforts to develop regional infrastructure projects,
which are especially critical for landlocked states and
are often beyond national capacities, have been hampered by investor concerns about the financial viability of regional economic communities. Hence, it becomes essential for RECs to develop transparent and
stable regional frameworks in order to attract greater
investments. In recent years they have registered some
successes in this sphere, particularly in promoting regional energy cooperation. They have also made inroads in the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade.45

To this end, SADC and ECOWAS have steadily increased their credibility even beyond that of relatively
successful independent states. Aside from its proposed Free Trade Zone, SADC still mainly provides
information for potential investors on its individual
member countries; while ECOWAS has begun developing region-wide policies. For instance, ECOWAS
announced in May 2012 the plan to form an ECOWAS
Investment Guarantee Agency to support its Common Investment Policy.46 In June 2012, ECOWAS announced its intention to begin using the UN Industrial
Development Organization’s (UNIDO) new portal for
data collection in support of the UN’s African Regional Investment Promotion Programme.47

36

The Infrastructure
also notes:

Consortium

for

Africa

Africa’s fragmentary infrastructure networks isolate
smaller countries and prevent them from harnessing
efficient large-scale technologies. Regional integration is essential to reducing Africa’s high infrastructure costs.”48 A 2004 study funded by the EU found
that market size is the primary determinant of FDI
inflow level and advocates that the SADC “further
deepen and harmonize policies within and among
member states.49

A worthwhile goal for a U.S.-led process would
be to support the REC's increasing capacity to work
as individual policymakers and planners, and to service as both recipients and allocators of funds. In this
vein, REC oversight of infrastructure and other critical development projects is likely to enhance the attractiveness of investment across southern Africa. As
the RECs continue to prove their value in promoting
security and good governance, they can begin to work
in concert and provide a framework for greater SubSaharan integration.
The U.S. Federal government and the states share
responsibility for infrastructure development and
maintenance, but Interstate highways, for instance,
fall under the purview of Federal mandates, as do
transcontinental railways. Of course, the concern always arises about corruption in the developing world,
but as Joseph Lapalombara pointed out in 1994, although the infrastructure development process in the
United States was a perfect model of corruption, the
railroads, roads, airports, industrial sectors, etc., are
now in place to support economic development. So
how much does a little graft really matter as long as
they get built?50
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CONTINUED U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
Post-independence U.S. efforts to engage with Africa have concentrated on short-term goals and cozy
relations with national leaders who have often used
U.S. patronage to wage war on their neighbors or their
own people, thus diminishing the average African’s
faith in American ideals. After the abrupt U.S. disengagement from Africa in 1993, policymakers hesitated
to re-engage even during the genocide in Rwanda. In
1994, after the scale of that crisis became apparent,
U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the African Conflict
Resolution Act,51 which offered U.S. support to the
OAU’s Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism, but as the OAU developed closer
ties to Gaddafi, the United States gradually scaled
back its support for this and other Africa-centered security initiatives.
From 1996, the United States began to provide
some funding and materiel for a number of security
initiatives in Africa, including the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), followed by the African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI). By this time, U.S. policymakers had realized the key to viable cooperation was
not in simply providing arms, but in building the capacity of African military institutions to operate effectively on their own, which led to the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program,
the Africa Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARP) and
increased African participation in the existing International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In 2001, the administration of President George
W. Bush transformed earlier efforts into the African
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Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA), which later became part of the multinational Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).
By 2005, for instance, the GPOI had trained more
than 69,000 military personnel from 73 countries,
more than 48,000 of whom have deployed to 20 operations around the world. These are effectively trained
and equipped troops able to manage security crises in
place of U.S. troops. The 5-year mandate for GPOI was
extended for another 5 years in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010
with, as the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
reported in June 2009, a goal to “shift from direct
training to building the capacity of foreign nations to
develop their own peacekeeping infrastructure and
capabilities.”52
The United States does not do this alone, but in concert with its partners in both the developed and developing world. The Group of Eight (G8) has supported
peacekeeping preparedness in Africa, with the United
Kingdom (UK) training over 12,000 peacekeepers
since 2005 through its support for 13 country-located
centers. France mainly uses African training centers
and has trained over 6,800 troops from 27 countries
in the same period, including nine peacekeeping battalions in 2008 alone. A 2009 G8 Peacekeeping Report
commended the AU and RECs for their ownership of
capacity-building efforts for regional missions. The report stated, “We recommend expanded partnerships
with the AU and with sub-regional organizations to
reinforce local capacities in all sectors. . . .”53
Despite U.S. support for the security initiatives in
the intervening period, the United States did not have
a clear focus on African security until the October 2007
formation of AFRICOM. As Benedikt Franke argued
in January 2007:
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[I]t may be difficult to muster political support for
further increasing the African regional peacekeeping
budget(s), however, only by supporting both immediate demands as well as long-term needs will African
capacity be enhanced in a sustainable manner and
thus be able to safeguard the growing number of U.S.
national interests on the continent.54

Robert Berschinski’s 2007 Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph on what AFRICOM should not
be is still fully accurate. Commingling of humanitarian and anti-terrorist rhetoric and activities has led to
a scattershot and uncoordinated effort that has not
inspired the faith of the African audience, which still
views AFRICOM’s mission as anti-terrorism first, securing oil reserves for U.S. exploitation second, countering Chinese influence third, and with African interests somewhere down the line.55
Some recent reviews undertaken on AFRICOM’s
behalf indicate that an improved public affairs campaign is in order. Assessments illustrate that positive
stories on the very real humanitarian activities AFRICOM has undertaken since its inception, such as
building schools, providing clean water and medical
care and repairing places of worship, are not making
their way into the international or even local press.56
An efficient way to increase AFRICOM's visibility is
through the public relations capabilities of the regional communities. Identifying the key regional and REC
leaders and encouraging them to assist in informing
their constituencies of the positive effects AFRICOM’s
presence has had in their larger communities is a more
direct target than approaching leaders in all the individual countries under AFRICOM’s purview. These
leaders can assist AFRICOM in understanding what
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projects are likely to have the most impact across their
regions and how to gain the support of individual
groups. This also lets the REC leaders know that AFRICOM officials truly aim to be their partners in the
future security, stability, and prosperity across the
larger Sub-Saharan region and throughout the path to
AU integration and development.
Encouraging Integrative Strategies to Address
Regional Security Concerns.
As AFRICOM continues to expand its engagement
in Africa, senior leadership both within and above the
Command must ensure the most efficient use of limited resources, especially in times of reduced budgets.
One way to do this is to increase the reach of existing and planned training and other activities not on
an individual country basis, but on an economies of
scale model, by revising programs to become “trainthe-trainer” focused and by directing activities to REC
participation, rather than toward individual countries
or U.S.-determined country blocs.
The more interoperable the RECs’ own security
structures become with each other and with the United States, and AU security apparati, the more likely
they are to become ingrained to the U.S. “way of doing things” and to prefer U.S. equipment, which will
further enhance engagement opportunities. Gradually, as more REC-specific trainers can produce more
effective REC-centered military groupings, the RECs
themselves will become more integrated. Longer-term
focus would then be on integrating training and activities among the RECs and ultimately with the AU to
create security structures across Sub-Saharan Africa.
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U.S. ARMY ROLE IN AFRICAN SECURITY
INTEGRATION
Cross-Cultural Training and Synchronizing
Strategic and Tactical Leadership.
While the U.S. Army and Special Operations community already play a significant role in AFRICOM
activities, especially logistical support for missions
across the continent and military-to-military training,
there is more the Army can do to enhance security
and stability in Africa, especially through its strategic
analysis capabilities. While the Army continues its efforts to prepare for smaller conflicts by cross-training
personnel, it has recognized that the more cross-cultural competency the service can impart before deployment to those on the ground in Africa, the greater
the chances of operational success. This is clearly
manifested through the Army’s regional approach to
using Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), particularly the
1st Armored Division’s 2nd Brigade dedicated to Africa, which has proven to be successful in working in
this multicultural environment.
It is not clear that the same understanding is carried
through to the strategic level. The U.S. Army Culture
Summit, held every Spring at or near Ft. Huachuca,
Arizona, from 2005 through 2011, was part of an effort
to integrate academic, private, and military assets to
enhance cultural awareness and cross-cultural competency for the warfighter.This effort worked in tandem
with the Human Terrain System, which was deployed
in Afghanistan and Iraq beginning in 2007. However, it
is increasingly critical for success in forward deployed
operations to have personnel trained to operate with
more integrated personnel from various contributing
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countries in many alien environments and not just in
“hot” war operations. As the United States expanded
its interest in Africa, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command's (TRADOC) Culture Center began developing blocs of language and culture training with limited resources for “phase zero” target locations, such
as Africa and the larger Middle East.
Ft. Huachuca’s previous Commander, General
John Custer, a U.S. Army War College graduate with a
background in Russian language and culture, emphasized the importance of this training. However, when
he retired, the Culture Summit was abandoned, the
Culture Center disbanded, and its highly skilled trainers moved on base and were absorbed into the civil
service where, despite years of doing identical work,
they have no seniority. This has not necessarily been
the most effective way for the Army to support the
public emphasis it claims to place on cultural training. The United States is nearly certain to continue to
engage in Africa and the Middle East for the next 100
years, and this kind of training should not be closed
down simply because the “hot” wars are ending.
While the Army has spent significant funds on
cross-cultural skills training, such as the Cadet Troop
Leader Training (CTLT) program, which sends Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) and West Point
cadets to foreign countries for leadership and cultural
training, it mainly prefers to do so either in classrooms
at U.S. bases like Ft. Huachuca or Ft. Leavenworth, KS,
or via video games formatted for hand-held mobile
devices. While there are many African military personnel in the United States studying military science
and other skills through IMET and other programs,
U.S. personnel are not encouraged to use these opportunities to interact with African military personnel,
unless they happen to share a classroom.
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The U.S. Army War College, as the Army’s “think
tank,” can provide programs to help strategic planners
understand and apply the important lessons learned
from prior failure to take culture into account when
preparing to deploy forces or engage a new ally or
adversary. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military
instituted cultural training because it was a tactical
necessity. Tactical commanders understand this and
this tactical necessity must be “synched” with strategic thinkers’ ability to facilitate and enable tactical
operations. Rather than downsizing on the soft skills
that will truly enhance military readiness to operate
in increasingly multicultural environments in smaller
teams in intimate settings, the U.S. Army War College can be at the forefront of research on how to best
achieve effective cross-cultural skills training.
In addition, as Phillip Van Neikerk noted in his
2009 article, Africa’s Leadership Vacuum, “Africa’s hope
for leadership is a younger generation that for now
remains on the margins.”57 The U.S. Army War College can, therefore, provide research opportunities to
identify up-and-coming individuals in countries and
counterpart organizations, such as RECs, who are
especially suited as partners for enhancing security
and stability in the region. This requires a clear understanding of the local decisionmaking environment and
the stresses and influences under which such leaders
or “leaders-to-be” may be operating. Socio-cultural
and network analysis are invaluable techniques for
enhancing the Army’s and AFRICOM’s ability to engage in the region and meet their mission goals.
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